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Abstract 
In an experimental study (n = 213) we vary the incivility of a user comment below a mock 
news post on the Facebook page of a German news outlet. We investigate determinants of the 
users’ intention to engage in corrective actions and their support for restrictions by Facebook 
and law enforcement. We test an integrated model and find that incivility of a comment 
affects users’ support for restrictive and intention for corrective actions, while the presumed 
influence of the comment does not have an effect. The users’ commitment to free speech 
decreases and paternalism increases their support for authoritative restrictions.  
 
Keywords: corrective and restrictive actions, presumed influence, user comments, 
incivility 
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Uncivil User Comments Increase Users’ Intention to Engage in Corrective Actions and Their 
Support for Authoritative Restrictive Actions 
Comment sections on news outlets’ social media pages provide a public forum for 
users to express their opinions on current issues (Dahlberg, 2011). Despite the valuable 
contribution of online discussions to the public sphere (Graham & Wright, 2015), a relevant 
share of comments is uncivil and perceived as undesirable by readers (Duggan & Smith, 
2016) and news outlets (Stroud, Scacco, Muddiman, & Curry, 2015). Uncivil comments 
“convey an unnecessarily disrespectful tone toward the discussion forum, its participants, or 
its topics” (Coe et al., 2014, p. 660). Following Coe and colleagues (2014), they include 
various forms like name-calling, aspersion, lying, vulgarity, and pejorative speech. 
Papacharissi (2004) names these aspects impoliteness and adds that incivility can include 
even more extreme forms of intolerant speech such as stereotypes against social groups, 
refusing equal rights to all, or threats against democracy. In line with this, other scholars have 
also complemented the list of uncivil expressions with various forms of undemocratic speech, 
such as racist or sexist terms (Chen, 2017). Under the term incivility we will consider all of 
these aspects because they can all threaten the quality of conversations and reach beyond sole 
negativity (Gervais, 2017).  
The regulation of uncivil comments is under much public and scholarly debate. News 
outlets engage in the moderation of the seemingly endless amount of comments (e.g., Stroud 
et al., 2015), some have even shut down their comments sections (Thurman, Cornia, & 
Kunert, 2016) or transferred them to social network sites. Social media platforms have 
created extensive community standards along which they regulate content. In Germany, 
comments in online discussions are also under legislative regulation to ban anti-democratic 
misuse of freedom of expression (Leisegang, 2017). Our paper complements the debate by 
investigating the users’ perspective on regulating uncivil comments on news pages. This 
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seems particularly relevant since the users command increased opportunities for corrective 
actions against disliked content and thus can complement regulation by media companies and 
the state. 
We root our analysis in research on presumed influence (e.g., Rojas, 2010; Sun, Shen, 
& Pan, 2008). This research outlines that – as a consequence of perceiving media content as 
undesirable or influential – media users may wish to restrict or correct this content. To 
advance existing research, we reflect the opportunities of corrective actions that users 
experience in social media and the restrictive actions that they can expect from authorities – 
in particular from the platform provider Facebook and state regulation. We further aim at 
understanding underlying reasons for users’ support for restrictions and their correction 
intentions. In an experimental design, we present participants (n = 213) with comments below 
a mock news post that was said to originate from the Facebook page of the German news 
outlet SpiegelOnline. The comments vary in that they express their opinion on the topic of the 
news post either civilly or uncivilly. In an integrated structural equation model, we test how 
the variation of incivility influences the users’ perception of the comment's effect on 
themselves and others as well as their support for restrictive actions and their correction 
intentions. Moreover, this study is among the first to test how paternalistic tendency and the 
appreciation of freedom of expression influence the support for restrictive actions and the 
intention for corrective actions. The results provide insights into the determinants of user 
participation in the regulation of comment sections and the assessment of the regulation 
practices of platform providers and the state. 
Restrictive and Corrective Actions 
When confronted with media messages users perceive as undesirable or hostile 
against their view, they could engage in restrictive and corrective actions to limit these 
messages and their potential influence (Feng & Guo, 2012; Sun, Shen et al., 2008; Xu & 
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Gonzenbach, 2008). With restrictive actions, people seek to stop disliked content (Rojas, 
2010). However, especially in traditional media, recipients have little possibilities of 
producing or interfering with existing content (for exceptions see Chia, Lu, & McLeod, 2004; 
Hoffner & Buchanan, 2002; Tsfati, Ribak, & Cohen, 2005). Thus, research on restrictive 
actions typically refers to people’s support for restrictions by authorities who command 
greater power over content. For example, scholars investigate people’s approval of 
government regulation (Dohle & Bernhard, 2014; Golan & Lim, 2016; Huh, Delorme, & 
Reid, 2006; Lim, 2017; Neuwirth & Frederick, 2002; Rojas, Shah, & Faber, 1996) or their 
support for restrictive actions by media organizations (McLeod, Detenber, & Eveland, 2001; 
McLeod, Eveland, & Nathanson, 1997; Wei & Lo, 2007).  
“Corrective actions, in contrast to restrictive actions such as censorship or regulation, 
refer to individuals’ engagement in reactive action against potentially harmful influence” 
(Lim, 2017, p. 978). They aim to counterbalance a message by correcting or contradicting the 
perceived wrong (Barnidge & Rojas, 2014; Rojas, 2010). The forms of corrective actions are 
heterogeneous. Considering online corrective action, researchers have investigated sharing 
countering information, engaging in online discussions, posting online comments, stating 
disapproval with a message in a reply comment or with Likes or Dislikes, and producing a 
countering video (Bernhard & Dohle, 2015; Chung, Munno, & Moritz, 2015; Golan & Lim, 
2016; Hwang et al., 2008; Kalch & Naab, 2017; Lim, 2017; Lim & Golan, 2011; Naab, 
Kalch, & Meitz, 2018; Rojas, 2010). In sum, these examples point to the fact that social 
media empower ordinary users to counterbalance content they perceive in conflict with their 
values or social norms often bypassing elites (Lim & Golan, 2011).  
The perceived incivility of a user comment and the perception that it will have 
negative effects (third-person perception) should influence users’ attitude toward restrictive 
and corrective actions. We will outline both proposed influences as well as the 
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interconnections between the two. We will consider the tendency to paternalism as a central 
theoretical explanation. To more fully understand the mechanisms, we will juxtapose users’ 
paternalism with their commitment to freedom of expression. This will help to provide a 
more elaborated picture of the contrary tendencies that may influence support for restrictive 
and intention to correction actions.  
Influence of Incivility 
Incivility challenges conversational norms and is perceived as socially deviant 
(Brown & Levinson, 1987; Grice, 1969; Stryker, Conway, & Danielson, 2016). It threatens 
the sense of face of the interaction partners. The face is the socially constructed identity that 
people act out during interactions (Goffman, 1967; Oetzel, Ting‐Toomey, Yokochi, 
Masumoto, & Takai, 2000). When an interaction does not adequately meet people's face 
wants, people experience negative emotions (Brett et al., 2007). In line with this, uncivil 
comments may be perceived as norm violations (Muddiman, 2017) and face threat because 
they question the readers’ need for autonomy and make them feel disrespected (Chen & Ng, 
2016) and, thus, can cause negative feelings (Gervais, 2017; Rösner, Winter, & Krämer, 
2016). Face theory further suggests that face-threatening acts may prompt retaliatory 
behaviors to restore one’s face or hurt the face of the perpetrator in return (Brett et al., 2007). 
Online incivility has also been shown to prompt retaliatory responses (Chen & Lu, 2017). 
Thus, we assume that the perceived incivility of a comment (independently of the presumed 
susceptibility of an audience to its influence, see below) might have a direct influence on 
support for restrictions and engagement in corrective actions. These responses should arise 
from the recipients’ negative emotions about the message or their desire to punish the 
communicator for the message (Chia et al., 2004; McLeod et al., 2001). A direct influence of 
the assessed severity of a message (in other words: incivility) on restrictive actions has been 
supported in numerous communication studies (McLeod et al., 2001; Paek, Lambe, & 
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McLeod, 2008; Shah, Faber, & Youn, 1999). In line with this, scholarship on hostile media 
perception indicates that when people presume that media coverage is negatively biased 
against their perspective they are inclined to restrictions and corrective actions (e.g., 
Feldman, Hart, Leiserowitz, Maibach, & Roser-Renouf, 2017; Hwang et al., 2008; Rojas, 
2010; Wei et al., 2011).  
To our knowledge, there is little counter-evidence to the influence of perceived 
severity on restrictive and corrective actions. However, Chia and colleagues (2004) do not 
find support for their hypothesis that perceived severity of an online video should increase 
support for censorship and reluctance to disseminate the video personally. Lim (2017) finds 
an influence of perceived undesirability on support for restrictions, but only an indirect effect 
of perceived undesirability on corrective actions via support for restrictions.  
Concerning user comments, the overall picture of the findings suggests, that an 
uncivil user comment should increase support for restrictive and corrective actions compared 
to a civil comment:  
H1: The support for restrictions by authorities is greater for an uncivil than a civil 
comment. 
H2: The intention to engage in corrective actions is greater for an uncivil than a civil 
comment. 
Influence of Third-Person Perception and Paternalism 
Besides the perceived incivility of a user comment, the presumed influence of the 
comment should determine the users’ support for restrictive actions and their intention to 
engage in corrective actions. Presumed influence of messages is examined under the third-
person perception hypothesis. The third-person perception is the tendency for people to 
believe that others are more affected by the media than they are themselves (Davison, 1983). 
It can be explained by people’s self-enhancement motivation: people perceive themselves as 
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superior to others in the sense of being less susceptible to potential negative influences. This 
discrepancy between presumed influences on self and others is a robust finding in 
communication research across a multitude of message domains (Paul, Salwen, & Dupagne, 
2000; Sun, Pan, & Shen, 2008). It has also been supported for the presumed effects of user 
comments (Chen & Ng, 2016, 2017; Houston, Hansen, & Nisbett, 2011).  
The perceptual discrepancy between presumed influence on self and others can lead to 
attitudinal and behavioral consequences, the so-called third-person effect. It is among the 
well-supported consequences of third-person perception that presumably influential media 
messages can prompt people to support restrictive actions to protect the vulnerable others 
from harmful effects (Feng & Guo, 2012; Xu & Gonzenbach, 2008). This holds for 
traditional media content (Bernhard & Dohle, 2014; Rosenthal, Detenber, & Rojas, 2018; 
Wei et al., 2011) as well as online content like online ads for cosmetic surgery (Lim, 2017), 
internet pornography (Lee & Tamborini, 2005), political parody videos on YouTube (Golan 
& Lim, 2016), and social media content (Dohle & Bernhard, 2014). To our knowledge, no 
study has yet examined the effect of third-person perception on support for restrictions of 
user comments. The current study would like to contribute further evidence:  
H3: The stronger the users’ third-person perception of a user comment, the stronger 
is the users’ support for restrictions of the comment by authorities. 
Studies considering the influence of a message’s presumed influence on online 
corrective actions are limited in number (on offline corrective actions, e.g., Barnidge & 
Rojas, 2014; Wei, Chia, & Lo, 2011): Rojas (2010) indicates an effect of third-person 
perception on online information sharing and opinion expression. Golan and Lim (2016) 
show that third-person perception influences social media activism against ISIS’s online 
recruitment propaganda. However, Lim (2017) cannot support this effect in a study on online 
advertising. Lim and Golan (2011) find that the perception of influence on others was a good 
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predictor in explaining participants' willingness to engage in political social media activism 
against political parody videos on YouTube. The current study aims at contributing further 
evidence. We postulate:  
H4: The stronger the users’ third-person perception on a user comment, the stronger 
is the users’ intention to engage in corrective action against the comment. 
A central theoretical explanation for the effect of third-person perception on rectifying 
behaviors is users’ paternalistic orientation (Chia et al., 2004; McLeod et al., 2001; McLeod 
et al., 1997; Sun, Pan et al., 2008). Paternalism is a desire to keep others from hurting 
themselves, also by sometimes limiting their rights with a benign intention. This 
psychological phenomenon is believed to involve a feeling of self-superiority in that those 
manifesting paternalism believe to be less susceptible for negative influences and to know 
better what is good for others, whereas others are seen as more naïve, susceptible, and 
vulnerable. As such, paternalistic orientation is related to greater perceived influence on the 
more vulnerable others compared to oneself (McLeod et al., 1997). In a meta-analysis, the 
presumed vulnerability of the audience indeed turned out to be a significant moderator of 
third-person perception (Sun, Pan et al., 2008). Beyond that, the concept of paternalism also 
implies action taken on behalf of others, who are seen as in need of protection. Thus, 
paternalism is assumed to be directly related to support for censorship to finally protect others 
because of a concern for their well-being (McLeod et al., 2001).  
H5: The higher a user’s paternalistic tendency, the higher is their support for 
restrictions of an uncivil user comment by authorities.  
To our knowledge, paternalism has not yet been related to the intention for corrective 
action to change or counterbalance media content. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to 
assume that people with a greater tendency to protect others and a sense of superior ability to 
do so might more likely intent to engage against uncivil user comments beyond only 
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supporting restrictions by authorities since in social media they finally command means of 
intervention. Given the lack of existing research, we pose a research question:  
RQ1: Does a user’s paternalistic tendency influence their intention to engage in 
corrective action against a user comment? 
Influence of Incivility on Third-Person Perception 
Extensive research has identified numerous factors that determine this discrepancy 
between presumed influences on self and on others (for an overview, Sun, Pan et al., 2008). 
A key factor is that the severity of a message increases the third-person discrepancy (Gunther 
& Storey, 2003). This “negative influence corollary” is the result of a “self-serving bias” 
(Gunther & Mundy, 1993) or “self-enhancement bias” (Perloff, 2002). Individuals are eager 
to project a superior self-image and deny or downplay their susceptibility to messages with 
undesirable influences. The perceptual gap is assumed to diminish when the message is 
perceived as more socially desirable (e.g., Gunther & Mundy, 1993; Lim, 2017; Sun, Pan et 
al., 2008; Zhong, 2009; evidence from experimental tests with manipulations of the 
undesirable character of the message is provided by Eveland & McLeod, 1999; Scherr & 
Müller, 20171). 
Ample literature suggests that uncivil messages are perceived as undesirable. They 
threaten the face of the interaction partners, make them feel disrespected and restricted, and 
cause negative feelings (see above, e.g., Chen & Lu, 2017; Coe et al., 2014; Gervais, 2017; 
Muddiman, 2017). Therefore, we suggest that uncivil user comments cause a stronger third-
person perception than civil comments. However, not all studies find empirical support for 
such relationship (Lambe & McLeod, 2005). About user comments, Chen and Ng (2016) 
argue that uncivil comments would lose persuasive power because they threaten the readers’ 
sense of face and are perceived as unjustified and outside societal norms. Jenkins and 
Dragojevic (2011) relate face theory to resistance to persuasion. They indicate that people 
CORRECTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE ACTIONS      12 
perceive demeaning and controlling messages as face threats and may react to these messages 
by derogating the source and the particular message. Chen and Ng (2017) indeed show that 
uncivil comments are presumed to have a weaker effect on others’ opinion than civil 
comments (the authors only test the presumed effect on others, not on self). This suggests that 
incivility could even lead to a weaker third-person perception.  
To summarize, research in the area of uncivil media messages provides a 
heterogeneous picture: While third-person research generally assumes a stronger third-person 
discrepancy with more socially undesirable messages, face theory suggests a decreased 
presumed effect of more uncivil messages. Hence, we ask a research question:  
RQ2: Does an uncivil user comment lead to a different third-person perception 
compared to a civil comment? 
Influence of Commitment to Freedom of Expression  
Paternalism seems to be a plausible psychological explanation of why people wish to 
rectify media content when they perceive it as uncivil and influential. However, focusing 
only on a mechanism that explains the motivation to counter a message would disregard 
competing mechanisms that motivate acceptance of messages – even despite these messages 
being uncivil and influential. Thus, in the pursuit to develop an integrated model support for 
restrictive actions and intention to corrective actions, we consider people’s commitment to 
freedom of expression as additional, but countering influential factor.  
Free speech is a central value in Western societies allowing individuals to express 
their mind without fear. It is protected to foster the free development of the individual and 
serve the collective good in a democratic society. Most Western constitutions grant freedom 
of expression even to extreme messages and messages perceived undesirable by some. 
However, the kind of privileges, that freedom of expression enjoys, varies across Western 
countries (for a comparison of US and Germany, Nieuwenhuis, 2002). In Germany, the 
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country of the present study, and in other European countries, anti-democratic utterances do 
not automatically enjoy the same protection as any other political utterances. Grounded in the 
experiences with the terror of the German National Socialist regime in the 1930s and 1940s, 
the German notion of free speech includes that “Democracy must be protected against anti-
democratic groups, and freedoms must be protected against dictatorial movements” 
(Nieuwenhuis, 2002, p. 200). By this understanding, the German government passed the 
Network Enforcement Act in July 2017. The law governs conditions under which social 
media platforms that exceed a certain number of users will have to take down hate speech 
(Leisegang, 2017). Different from that, the US understanding of freedom of expression 
follows the notion of the free market place of ideas which demands that people must be able 
to consider every opinion. State interference in comment sections runs counter to this 
understanding.  
Beyond the constitutional interpretation of freedom of expression and its institutional 
guarantee, there is the appreciation of freedom of expression on the individual level. Some 
people are more able or willing to consider the value of free speech as a general good to 
individuals and society. People who generally value freedom of expression more, are more 
likely to grant this freedom to extreme statements and communicators, and show less 
approval of restrictions. Differences between individuals in their commitment to freedom of 
expression arise not only from different cultural backgrounds but also from demographic, 
psychological, and sociopolitical differences (Bahry, Boaz, & Gordon, 1997; Gibson, 2006; 
Hurwitz & Mondak, 2002; Lambe, 2004; Paek et al., 2008; McLeod, Sotirovic, Voakes, Guo, 
& Huang, 1998). 
When considering interventions against user comments in social media, the 
commitment to freedom of expression should play a role of inhibiting all too comprehensive 
limitations of user-generated content. Appreciation of the principle of free speech should 
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motivate weighting the downsides of media restrictions. Even with the more restrictive 
German notion of freedom of expression, any restriction to free speech is viewed with 
suspicion (Nieuwenhuis, 2002). Indeed, people who value freedom of expression higher, are 
more inclined to concede it even to undesirable or extreme expressions (Davis, 1990; Lambe, 
2004; Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse & Wood, 1995; Paek et al., 2008; Price, Tewksbury, & 
Huang, 1998; Zhao & Cai, 2008). Thus, we postulate:  
H6: The higher a user’s general commitment to freedom of expression, the lower is 
the user’s support for restrictions by authorities of an uncivil user comment. 
Lim (2017) puts forward that “many socially harmful messages, even if they are 
extremely harmful and undesirable […], receive some constitutional protection in the United 
States, which limits the efficacy of legal regulation” (p. 976). The users can thus complement 
legal regulation with corrective actions – but their stance toward the protection of the 
constitution should not be overlooked. However, literature has not yet touched upon the 
question of whether the commitment to freedom of expression also affects individuals' 
willingness to engage in corrective actions against messages they perceive as undesirable or 
influential. Moreover, the motivation of German users to complement legal regulation has not 
been examined. Given the lack of empirical research, we pose the question 
RQ3: Does a user’s general commitment to freedom of expression influence their 
intention to engage in corrective action against an uncivil user comment? 
Theoretical Model 
Figure 1 summarizes the assumed relationships in a conceptual model. Beyond the 
determinants under investigation, further factors might plausibly influence support for 
restrictive and intention for corrective actions against a user comment. To control for these 
influences, the model incorporates two additional constructs: In general, people are more 
likely to tolerate content that is in line with their values and supports their attitudes (Huh et 
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al., 2006; Price et al., 1998). People who depreciate a group, person, or idea that is under 
attack in a user comment will perceive the user comments as less uncivil and less likely favor 
regulation of such comments (Kalch & Naab, 2017). Thus, we will control for the 
participants’ attitudes towards the subject of the comment (i.e., refugees, see below). 
Additionally, the model includes participatory Facebook use. Readers who generally engage 
more often actively in social media, are more experienced and will also engage more likely in 
specific situations (Naab et al., 2018).  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Method 
Design and procedure 
We carried out a between-subjects design, varying incivility of a user comment (civil 
vs. uncivil). The participants filled a web-based survey. Integrated into the survey, they read a 
mock news post reporting on the number of refugees in Germany. The post was said to 
originate from the well-known and highly reputable German news outlet SpiegelOnline and 
said to be posted on the outlet’s Facebook page. The post and the comments section were 
presented in the original layout of the SpiegelOnline Facebook page, yet did not contain 
personalized or interactive elements. We choose the topic of refugees because it had 
dominated news cycles at the time of the study. As a consequence of ongoing violent 
conflicts in Arab and African countries, a large number of refugees sought asylum in 
Germany provoking controversial debates about handling this immigration increase and thus 
also eliciting adversarial online comments. The presented news post had received three user 
comments. Two comments consisted of neutral statements and were identical in both 
conditions. We manipulated the third comment in two different versions (Table 1): The civil 
comment took a stand against receiving refugees in Germany and was formulated forthrightly 
and explicitly negative against refugees. In the uncivil condition, we added elements of 
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incivility (similar Gervais, 2017). The uncivil comment contained insulting, derogatory, and 
vulgar expressions, exaggeration, and included a highly discriminatory perspective against 
refugees (following Coe et al., 2014; Papacharissi, 2004).2 The news post and the comments 
were based on actual messages on social network sites. After the experiment, the participants 
were thoroughly debriefed.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Participants 
We recruited participants via mailing lists, emails, and postings in a wide variety of 
Facebook groups to enable a broad sample. Two hundred twenty-two participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the two conditions and answered the online questionnaire. To 
strengthen the external validity of the results, our analyses refer to the 213 participants who 
indicated at least rare usage of user comments (34.3% male; age: M = 28.30, SD = 11.95; 
7.5% of the sample hold no school qualification or a secondary school certificate at best, 
46.9% hold a university (of applied science) entrance certificate, 44.1% finished a university 
(of applied sciences) program, 1.4% did not answer the question).  
Measures 
Unless stated otherwise, participants answered on a scale from 1 = fully disagree to 7 
= fully agree.  
Support for restrictive actions by authorities. To measure support for restrictive 
actions by Facebook moderators and by the law enforcement agency, participants indicated 
their reaction in case they would find this comment on Facebook on a scale from 1 = not at 
all to 7 = fully. The items concerning actions by Facebook moderators were: Moderators 
should delete this comment, block the account of the comment author, check future 
comments of this author prior to publication, check future comments of this author after 
publication, use automatic computerized control of comments, call the law enforcement 
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agency into action. The mean index of the items had acceptable reliability (α = .86; M = 3.70; 
SD = 1.67). The items concerning actions by the law enforcement agency were: The law 
enforcement agency should prosecute the comment author, force Facebook to block the 
account of the comment author, force Facebook to delete the comment, check future 
comments of this author prior to publication, check future comments of this author after 
publication. The mean index had acceptable reliability (α = .88; M = 3.06; SD = 1.70). In the 
later analysis, the support for restrictive actions by authorities was modeled as a latent 
construct influencing two indicators, namely actions by Facebook moderators and by the law 
enforcement agency. It should be noted that not all of the restrictive actions are necessarily 
carried out. However, since the study attempts to investigate the perspective of the users, it 
includes potential instruments users might support independent of their application.  
Intention to engage in corrective actions. Participants indicated on a scale from 1 = 
not at all to 7 = fully how likely they are to rebuke the comment author in a private message, 
rebuke the comment author in a public reply, report the comment with the flagging button, 
report it to the law enforcement agency, make other users aware of the comment, so that they 
react, report it in a private message to the page moderators. We computed a mean index 
(α = .80; M = 2.33; SD = 1.30).  
Third-person perception. Participants rated the presumed effect of the comment on 
their knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors toward the German refugee policy and refugees 
with five items (α = .87; M = 1.68; SD = 1.09). Additionally, they rated the presumed effect 
on others on equivalent items (α = .91; M = 4.02; SD = 1.46). The respondents presumed the 
comment would have a significantly greater effect on others than on themselves, t(212) = 
20.330, p < .0001. The third-person perception was computed as the difference between the 
presumed effect on others and on self, with higher values indicating a greater presumed effect 
on others and a theoretical range between -6 and +6 (M = 2.34; SD = 1.68). 
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General commitment to freedom of expression was measured with six items 
(Miklikowska, 2011; Rojas et al., 1996, e.g., "No matter how controversial the idea is, an 
individual should be able to express it publicly"). A mean index was computed (α = .73; 
M = 4.74; SD = 1.12).3  
Paternalism was measured with three items (McLeod et al., 2001, e.g., “Sometimes it 
is necessary to protect people from harming themselves”; α = .65; M = 5.63; SD = .88).4  
Attitudes toward refugees was measured with six items (adapted from Zick & Preuß, 
2016, e.g., “The high number of refugees endangers the future of Germany”). High values 
indicate negative attitudes (α = .86; M = 3.08; SD = 1.33).  
Participatory Facebook use was measured with three items. Participants indicated 
how often they a) comment on articles, b) reply to comments of other users, and c) post 
reactions to comments of other users (1 = never to 8 = very often). The items were aggregated 
to a mean index (α = .81; M = 2.47; SD = 1.59).  
Manipulation check. Eight items on incivility asked participants how much they 
perceived the comment to be insulting, impolite, vulgar, derogatory, to infringe personality 
rights, infringe human rights, discriminate, and exaggerate (α = .92; M = 5.32; SD = 1.58).5  
Results 
The model was assessed with structural equation modeling explaining the support for 
restrictive actions by authorities and the intention to engage in corrective actions. Maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimates for the model were calculated using AMOS (Figure 2). The model 
fits the data well (n = 213; p = .143; CMIN(12) = 17.188; RMSEA = 0.045; PCLOSE = 
0.519; CFI = 0.989; SRMR = 0.0413). Bootstrap standard errors and bias-corrected 95% 
confidence intervals were generated based on 2,000 bootstrap samples. For simplification 
purposes, error terms, and covariances between exogenous variables were omitted from the 
figure. The model allows for all plausible correlations between exogenous variables, but no 
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correlations with the manipulated variable. Due to their skewed distribution, the variables 
paternalism and participatory Facebook use were z-transformed before inclusion in the 
structural equation model. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
The model shows significant, direct effects of the manipulated variable on support for 
restrictive actions (β = .479; p = .001) as well as on intention to engage in corrective actions 
(β = .301; p = .001). Thus, H1 and H2 receive support. Albeit, the level of incivility does not 
influence third-person perception (β = .000 p = .996; RQ2). Third-person perception 
influences neither support for restrictive actions (β = .002; p = .990) nor intention for 
corrective actions (β = -.078; p = .214). H3 and H4 are not supported. Supporting H5, we find 
a significant, direct, positive effect of paternalism on the support for restrictive actions 
(ß = .150; p = .018). We find no direct effect of paternalism on the intention to engage in 
corrective actions (β = .080; p = .214; RQ1). Paternalism does not show indirect effects. 
Commitment to freedom of expression has a significant, negative effect on support for 
restrictive actions by authorities (β = -.263; p = .001). Supporting H6, the more important 
people consider free speech, the less they perceive intervention by Facebook moderators and 
law enforcement as adequate. However, appreciation of freedom of expression does not 
influence the intention to engage in corrective actions (β = .051; p = .364; RQ3).  
Considering the control variables, the more people have negative attitudes toward 
refugees above average, the less they consider restrictive actions of authorities relevant (β = -
.283; p = .001) and the less they intend to engage in corrective actions themselves (β = -.338; 
p = .001). People who generally engage more actively in comment spaces do not support 
restrictive actions more or less than less engaged users (β = .066; p = .382). However, people 
who generally engage more actively in comment spaces more likely intend to engage in 
corrective actions against the specific comment (β = .414; p = .001).  
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Discussion 
The paper provided a unique contribution to the scholarship and the practice of social 
media regulation because it expanded the view to corrective actions as a potential 
consequence beyond support for restrictive actions by authorities. It addressed the fact that in 
today’s media environment, users are less dependent on the regulation practices of 
authorities. The empowered public can directly respond to what it may regard as severely 
uncivil or harmfully influential social media content. 
The study had an interest in understanding the role of incivility of media content and 
third-person perception in inducing restrictive and corrective actions. As expected, the 
incivility level of the user comment had a direct effect on support for restrictions and 
intention to engage in corrective actions. Additionally, comment readers with more negative 
attitudes towards the group attacked in the user comments deemed restrictive actions less 
necessary and intended fewer corrective actions themselves. This is in line with research 
stating that perceiving media content as hostile and biased against one’s view leads to 
restrictive and corrective actions (Feldman et al., 2017; Hwang et al., 2008; Rojas, 2010; Wei 
et al., 2011). However, contrary to expectations, support for restrictions by authorities did not 
increase with increasing self-other discrepancy of the influence of the user comments. The 
model test did also not yield a significant path from third-person perception to intention to 
correction action. It seemed irrelevant for support for media regulations whether others are 
presumably strongly influenced. Thus, the study supported findings that show that the 
evaluation of a message per se has a stronger or exclusive influence than the presumption of 
effect (Bernhard & Dohle, 2014). This finding seems plausible when realizing that post hoc 
corrective and restrictive actions are sanctions for communication misbehavior and not 
necessarily measures to prevent an effect on the recipients (such as a priori censorship of 
media content).  
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The results further expand the literature on corrective action. Differentiating between 
restrictive and corrective actions turned out particularly fruitful since the determinants of both 
constructs partly differed. The findings suggested that support for authoritative regulation is a 
function of people’s tendency for paternalism. People who assumed more than the average of 
the participants to know best what is good for others and were more willing to limit others’ 
rights to prevent them from harmful consequences, were more inclined to ask for institutional 
restrictions of user comments. In contrast, paternalism did not lead users to a higher intention 
to perform corrective actions themselves. Future studies might want to investigate whether 
user regulation is perceived less effective and appropriate to protect vulnerable readers. This 
might also help news organizations to understand if they should actively engage in regulation 
in comment threads to signal to their readers that they provide a safe space for discussions.  
People who commit to freedom of expression opposed restrictions by authorities. 
However, their appreciation of freedom of expression did not determine their stand toward 
corrective actions by the user. It seems that a commitment to freedom of expression in the 
abstracts makes people suspicious about institutionalized intervention, while it does not 
influence trust in the deliberate nature of the unregulated debate. It is a difficult task for 
platform providers and news organizations to find a balance between providing safe spaces 
for vulnerable groups but at the same time not limiting free debate about controversial topics. 
Surely, this balance is specific for each community and needs careful observation of the 
comment streams of each news outlet.  
Participatory social media use was introduced as a control variable in the model. It 
turned out to be the most important influential factor in explaining the intention to engage in 
corrective actions. Thus, experience in producing user-generated content and giving feedback 
to others motivated people to act against problematic content. This result is in line with 
findings of online bystander research indicating that knowledge about intervention strategies 
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increases corrective action (Naab et al., 2018). It also suggests that platform providers and 
news organization who wish to involve users in the regulation of problematic comments 
might for one thing explicitly encourage regular users to apply their experience to intervene 
in comment threads. For another thing, they might want to point out the need for intervention 
and provide precise correction strategies to less experienced users. Finally, it remains the task 
of future research to explore the extent to which the now habitual handling of social media by 
numerous users has led to the establishment of behavioral norms about users’ baseline 
engagement within these media. 
The present study served as a pioneer effort to concurrently test a comprehensive 
model of determinants of restrictive and corrective actions, including both paternalism and 
appreciation of freedom of expression. It seemed that the two constructs are opposing 
determinants of support for restrictive actions by authorities. Users with a disposition for 
paternalism appreciate institutionalized media control while a commitment to freedom of 
expression makes people cautious about extensive intrusions of authorities.  
Consistent with an extensive body of knowledge regarding self-other perceptual gaps, 
the results of our study supported the perceptual component of the third-person effect. 
Individuals were more likely to perceive others as more susceptible to uncivil user comments 
than themselves. Given the scientific evidence that uncivil comments indeed can have 
detrimental effects on individuals’ attitudes and online and offline behavior (Anderson et al., 
2014; Hwang & Kim, 2016; Thorson et al., 2010), it is noteworthy that people recognized the 
potential influence of uncivil user comments. However, they also showed the self-serving 
bias found with many other mediated messages, neglecting or at least understating effects of 
incivility on themselves. Albeit, the results did not support the negative influence corollary 
— the magnitude of the third-person perception presumably being affected by the 
undesirability of the message. While this relation is a robust finding in many studies, other 
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studies have also found that the severity of a message does not necessarily correlate with the 
attributed influence (Lambe & McLeod, 2005; McLeod et al., 2001; Paek et al., 2008). 
Additionally – and this lends substance to the recent findings – the effect of message 
undesirability on third-person perception has rarely been tested experimentally. The current 
study used a between-subject experimental design that manipulated the level of incivility of a 
user comment, keeping other features of the message and its context constant. The current 
finding substantiates claims by Chen and Ng (2016) who suppose that uncivil comments may 
lead to resistance to persuasion and lower presumed vulnerability of others because they 
might be perceived as transgressing societal norms of tolerable interaction style and thus less 
effective.  
Limitations and Future Research 
Several factors undermine the validity of our results: First, the study used a mock 
Facebook page and investigated the intention to engage in corrective actions in a hypothetical 
situation. This procedure aimed at increasing the internal validity of the results. However, it 
limits ecological validity because it does not measure user behavior in a real-world scenario 
of an interactive and personalized social network site.  
Although the study adapted scales for commitment to freedom of expression and 
paternalism from literature that have proved to be successful, the low internal consistencies of 
the scales in the present study suggest to replicate the findings on the influences of these 
constructs with improved measures.  
The user comments referred to a highly controversial debate in Germany about online 
hate speech and refugee discrimination. Surely further studies with other thematic contexts 
are necessary for generalizability. Additionally, different from the manipulated user 
comments, comments can also include less blatant forms of discrimination, justification 
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strategies, or references to presumed opinion climate. These may affect readers' perception of 
severity, the presumption of influence, and resistance to persuasion.  
The design focused on comments on a Facebook news page. Such discussions are 
vitally relevant to news engagement and public discourse. As a complement, future studies 
might want to test whether the present results are generalizable to further media content and 
to other platforms and providers who offer different instruments of intervening with 
corrective actions and moderate to varying degrees.  
Despite the broad recruitment, the sample was not representative of the German 
Facebook users. Primarily, the respondents have a higher level of education than the actual 
Facebook user community. Although interest in online news is greater among well-educated 
users (Hölig & Hasebrink, 2015), it would be rash to generalize the findings to all users of 
Facebook news pages. At least, research indicates that the likelihood to intervene against 
inappropriate behavior is less dependent on socio-demographics (Fischer et al., 2011). While 
the experimental setting and the convenient sample of our study are not about “making 
generalizations, but testing them” (Mook, 1983, 380; Meltzer, Naab & Daschmann, 2012), 
future studies need to replicate the findings with representative samples.  
Conclusion 
Sadly, uncivil user comments accompany many online discussions in social media. 
While social media platform providers and state authorities intervene with technical means 
and legal sanctions, the users, too, can engage against deviant comments. In social media, for 
the first time, users are equipped with considerable instruments to correct perceived harmful 
messages by writing their messages, liking or disliking the content of others or connect to 
further users or moderators. Their actions complement institutionalized regulatory actions. 
Therefore, the present study did not only contribute knowledge to the scholarship on 
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corrective action but also the practice of social media regulation. It provided insights into the 
users’ assessment of who should engage in problematic comment threads.  
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Endnotes 
1 Many further studies rather assume the undesirability of a message (e.g., Golan & 
Lim, 2016) than measure or even manipulate it. Some studies measure perceived social 
desirability (e.g., Jensen & Hurley, 2005; Lim, 2017) or use various topics with natural 
variations of negative severity (e.g., Gunther & Mundy, 1993; Hoorens & Ruiter, 1996). 
Others compare the perception of people with opposing attitudes towards the topic indicating 
reversed perceptions of the desirability of the same message (Driscoll & Salwen, 1997). 
Further studies vary the framing of the message as being desirable or undesirable (Brosius & 
Engel, 1996). Some regard a single message and measure the presumed effects on various, 
more or less desirable outcomes (Davis, Morrison, Johnson, & Ross, 2002). 
2 Although formulated very directly and impolite, the civil stimulus comment does not 
include such markers of incivility that separate uncivil from “merely” impolite speech like 
discrimination and undemocratic content. Therefore, we decided to name the conditions 
“civil” and “uncivil” (for a differentiation between impoliteness and incivility see 
Papacharissi, 2004).  
3 Internal consistence of the scale could not be improved by dropping items. A 
principal component factor analysis was conducted on the six items with oblique rotation 
(direct oblimin). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified the sampling adequacy for the 
analysis, KMO = .77, and all KMO values for individual items were at least 0.70. One factor 
had an eigenvalue over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and explained 53.70% of the variance.  
4 Internal consistence of the scale could not be improved by dropping items. A 
principal component factor analysis was conducted on the three items with oblique rotation 
(direct oblimin). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified the sampling adequacy for the 
analysis, KMO = .65, and all KMO values for individual items were at least 0.64. One factor 
had an eigenvalue over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and explained 59.06% of the variance. 
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5 A t-test showed that the uncivil comment was perceived as more uncivil (n = 100, 
M = 6.26, SD = 1.17) than the civil (but still negative against refugees) comment (n = 113; 
M = 4.49, SD = 1.42), t(209.937) = -10.01, p <.0001. This indicates that the manipulation of 
incivility was successful.  
To control for the validity of the setting, we measured investigative quality (M = 4.55, 
SD = 1.26), comprehensibility (M = 5.66, SD = 1.33), and credibility of the news post 
(M = 5.05, SD = 1.38) as well as realism (M = 5.72, SD = 1.87) and authenticity of the 
comments (M = 5.72; SD = 1.50). Differences between experimental conditions were neither 
visible for perceived investigative quality, t(211) = -.12, p = .907, comprehensibility, 
t(211) = 1.46, p = .145, and credibility of the news post, t(211) = -0.87, p = .388, nor for the 
perceived realism, t(211) = -0.29, p = .771, and authenticity of the comment section, 
t(211) = -0.17, p = .867. 
  




Civil comment Uncivil comment 
Just so that you guys understand me, I'm 
not a Nazi, but I stand by my opinion. 
Not all of them that come are bad, but 
enough is enough! A lot of people come 
here just to get our money and other 
things and to take advantage of us. They 
come and want work and money and 
complain afterwards that it’s all not 
enough. And us Germans are left out in 
the cold! All you hear is, you need to 
adapt, accept, tolerate, … They should 
not be here in the first place, let alone 
demand for anything! Integration is 
failing because they have no respect for 
us and our culture. They all need to be 
deported!! 
Just so that you guys understand me, I'm not a 
Nazi, but I stand by my opinion. We've got 
enough of these parasites here. Enough is 
enough! These bootlickers come here just to 
get our money and other things and to take 
advantage of us. Just like a plague of locusts, 
more and more people are coming and want 
work and money and moan afterwards that it’s 
all not enough. And us Germans get the shit 
end of the stick! All you hear is, you need to 
adapt, accept, tolerate, … The dirty criminal 
asylum pack should not be here in the first 
place, let alone demand for anything! Fuck 
integration! They have no respect for us and 
our culture. They all need to be disposed of as 
genetic hazardous waste!! 
Note:  
The study was conducted in Germany. The original German comments were translated for 
publication.  
Main differences between the comments boldfaced.  
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Figures 
Figure 1  
Theoretical model of the influences on support for restrictive actions by authorities and 





CORRECTIVE AND RESTRICTIVE ACTIONS      41 
Figure 2  
Structural equation model of the influences on support for restrictive actions by authorities 
and intention to engage in corrective actions 
 
n = 213; p = .143; CMIN(12) = 17.188; RMSEA = 0.045; PCLOSE = 0.519; CFI = 0.989; 
SRMR = 0.0413 
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001 
Dashed lines mark non-significant paths (p > .05).  
 
